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the norms of moral obligation exist in virtue of God’s commands—and this 
accountability defense of it. If the really distinctive feature of the obligatory 
is the accountability relationship, why must God be cast as the commander 
of moral norms, rather than as simply their enforcer, or guarantor?
This is a very good book with which to think through systematically 
the case for a divine command account of moral obligation. It gathers in 
the most powerful arguments for the divine command account, develops 
them further, and generously and fairly deploys them against a range 
of argumentative opponents. As Evans predicts (vi), I was not moved 
from my antivoluntarism by these arguments. But it did become clearer 
to me where there was room for divine command theorists to develop 
their view in a way that would place real pressure on nonvoluntarist 
accounts.6 
6Thanks to Terence Cuneo for helpful comments on a draft of this review.
Honor For Us: A Philosophical Analysis, Interpretation and Defense, by William 
Lad Sessions. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010. 224 pages. $110.00 
cloth.
JASON DECKER, Carleton College
In the preface to William Lad Sessions’s monograph Honor For Us, he ex-
plains that he is not joining a philosophical conversation, but rather trying 
to start one. Contemporary philosophers haven’t had much to say about 
honor, except in passing. (Perhaps the most notable exception is Anthony 
Appiah’s The Honor Code, which appeared shortly after Sessions’s book.) 
Sessions’s main thesis is that the concept of personal honor, though much 
maligned—and admittedly dangerous—might just have something im-
portant to offer us, both in helping us to understand our social reality, 
and in providing us with an inspiring ideal. Sessions’s book is engag-
ingly written, philosophically interesting, and provocative—and in these 
ways, it does serve as an excellent conversation starter. In other ways, 
however, it could have been more effective at drawing readers into the 
conversation and convincing them that personal honor might be valuable 
“for us.”
Like most contemporary philosophers, I hadn’t thought much about 
the concept of honor before reading Sessions’s book. Indeed, I initially 
felt a bit disoriented and was well into the book before I felt I had a grip 
on what, exactly, Sessions was interested in initiating a discussion about. 
Insofar as I am accustomed to thinking in terms of honor, I usually have 
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in mind either (i) the activity of honoring (i.e., honoring a vow, promise, 
friend, or family member, etc.), or (ii) something like the moral virtue of 
integrity. Sessions tries, in Part I of the book, to help us home in on his 
intended subject matter, which is neither the activity of honoring nor the 
virtue of integrity, though it is connected in various ways to these things. 
It wasn’t until chapter 3 that Sessions introduced the concept of personal 
honor, which turns out to be the main subject of the book. Those of us 
on the sidelines (or out of the park altogether) would have been brought 
more effectively into the conversation had Sessions initiated the investiga-
tion with a few concrete and relatively developed examples of the central 
phenomenon instead of marching us through a number of related, but 
peripheral, phenomena.
Sessions acknowledges that contemporary philosophers (and academ-
ics more generally) are going to have a hard time recognizing personal 
honor and seeing how it applies not only to distant peoples and times but 
also to here and now. Rather late in the book he discusses this conceptual 
“blindness” and offers a hypothesis to explain it:
There is reason to suspect that contemporary academics, like the rest of their 
society are in the grips of a myth so strong that it clouds or even precludes 
recognition of certain kinds of social facts and values. The myth I have in 
mind is individualism. (120)
Our habit of thinking of ourselves primarily as autonomous, metaphysi-
cally independent individuals might, Sessions conjectures, make it hard 
to see how we have formed ourselves into a dense interconnected web 
of honor groups, each with its own distinctive code of honor. This sec-
tion of Sessions’s book is interesting, provocative, and important—indeed, 
important enough that Sessions should have put this material right at the 
front of the book. If one hopes to start a philosophical discussion on a cer-
tain topic, but suspects that one’s audience is largely blind to the relevant 
range of phenomena, one has some important preparatory work to do. 
The blindness of one’s audience surely needs to be addressed first (and 
at least partially cured), before the conversation can sensibly proceed. If 
Sessions’s diagnosis of the situation is right—if readers like me are con-
fused and disoriented because of some conceptual blindness brought 
about by unreflectively subscribing to a distorting myth—it seems that the 
minimally charitable thing to do is to offer us some help up front, rather 
than plunging ahead as if we weren’t blind.
Indeed, I found that Part I of the book, which was devoted to laying 
conceptual foundations, positively amplified my sense of disorientation 
and confusion, rather than clarifying the terrain. Sessions identifies six 
concepts of honor, five of them peripheral to the one that really inter-
ests him (i.e., personal honor). He suggests that these six concepts are 
connected through various relations of family resemblance. While there 
is much of philosophical interest in this section of the book, the reader 
can’t help but feel the terrain could be mapped in a more elegant and 
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illuminating way. For example, Sessions distinguishes conferred honor 
from recognition honor. Conferred honor is attributed to a subject on the 
basis of some purported excellence; but this basis needn’t actually exist 
and needn’t be excellent. Recognition honor, on the other hand, is “public 
esteem of . . . excellences . . . that merit or deserve such esteem” (14). Ac-
cording to Sessions, these two concepts of honor are distinct. Conferred 
honor is determined by (or “controlled by”) the honorer, whereas recog-
nition honor is determined by the excellences of the honoree. What is in 
common between them is that, in both cases, the existence of the honor 
depends on the activity of an honorer (with recognition honor, this activ-
ity is owed, whereas with conferred honor, it is a “gift”). Both of these 
are distinguished from positional honor, which involves a type of honor 
one has in virtue of having a high social position (status) or having ac-
complished some impressive achievement. This type of honor, Sessions 
says, does not require the activity of an honorer (it needn’t be attributed 
or recognized in order to exist).
All of this strikes me as rather like saying that there are three concepts 
of red-headedness: First, there is the kind that is attributed to a person 
on the basis of the attributor’s (perhaps very confused) assessment of the 
subject’s hair as being red; second, there is the kind that is recognized 
because it is there demanding to be recognized; and third, there is a kind 
that can be there whether or not anyone recognizes it or attributes it. 
I think it should be pretty obvious that this would be a confused way 
of mapping the conceptual terrain surrounding red-headedness. The 
first kind of red-headedness isn’t in fact a kind of red-headedness at all; 
merely calling someone red-headed doesn’t make them red-headed in 
any sense. Furthermore, we don’t want to distinguish a concept of red-
headedness where it expresses a property that is rightly recognized to be 
present from another concept where it expresses a property that is there, 
but may or may not in fact be recognized. Properties can, in general, be 
recognized because they’re there, or attributed when absent. There is no 
need to posit conceptual ambiguity to understand or explain this. And 
just as we would be confused to distinguish between conferred red-head-
edness, recognition red-headedness and positional red-headheadness, 
we would be confused to distinguish between conferred, recognition, 
and positional honor. Most importantly, calling someone honorable 
(or attempting to highlight their purported honor in some other way) 
doesn’t make it the case that they have honor in any sense. At best they 
have been honored.
And this last bit points to a partial source for the conceptual murkiness 
of Part I of Honor For Us. Sessions fails to properly distinguish between 
honoring (an activity), honor (a property), and honors (objects, broadly 
construed). Here’s a rough first shot that seems to be on the right track: 
Honor is worthiness to be held up; honoring is holding up; and honors 
are more-or-less tangible tokens of our attempts at holding up. If one is 
careful to keep in mind the distinction between the activity, the property, 
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and the tokens, the temptation to posit many different concepts of honor 
dissipates. The phenomena that Sessions tries to capture with conferred 
honor are just an amalgam of honoring (the activity) and honors (the 
tokens—which often play a part in the activity of honoring); recognition 
honor is an amalgam of honor (the property) and honoring (the activity); 
and positional honor appears to simply be fool’s honor—something that 
many people happen to mistake for honor-worthiness.
Sessions’s remaining two peripheral concepts of honor also look like 
they are better captured in our roughly-cast framework. First there is what 
he calls commitment honor, which involves upholding promises, agree-
ments, or principles. This strikes me as involving not a different concept 
of honor, but rather a different object of honoring. Second, there is what 
Sessions calls trust honor, which is a kind of trust that some communities 
jointly (as communities) place in their members. But isn’t this simply one 
way for members of a community to honor each other, not, as Sessions 
claims, a “conceptually distinct form of honor” (22)?
Sessions’s sixth concept of honor—what he refers to as the “vital valua-
tional center of honor” (35)—is personal honor. In the beginning of chap-
ter 4, he gives the following characterization: “[having personal honor] 
means someone possesses an effective sense of honor, understands and is 
committed to the honor code of some appropriately sized honor group, 
and openly trusts the members of the group, as they trust him, to act ac-
cordingly” (37). The honor code itself is a “mixed bag of rules, principles 
and ideals guiding conduct, affecting motivation, and luring appetite” 
(27). Having personal honor, Sessions tells us, is so initimately bound up 
with a person’s sense of their own identity that “the primary commitment 
of a personally honorable person, as such, must always be to the honor 
group and its code, whatever that code may be” (38, emphasis in the orig-
inal). Again, does this really involve a distinct concept of honor, rather 
than simply a particular conception of what makes a person honorable? 
It seems not. According to a particular honor group, it is group member-
ship together with adherence to the group’s honor code that makes one 
worthy of honoring. Putting things as Session does obscures the very real 
possibility that the group might simply be wrong about that.
Sessions does, to his credit, see that personal honor—as he understands 
it—at least appears to be on a “collision course with morality” (37). But he 
thinks that this is not necessarily so. An honor code, he suggests, can be a 
moral honor code—that is, it can either (i) contain or (ii) be constrained by 
morality. Concerning the first option, Sessions notes that the honor code 
could be such that it “contains at least some moral prescriptions and these 
dominate non-moral ones.” Sessions says that this will have the effect of 
“ensuring that the morally honorable person, as such, cannot perform an 
immoral act in the name of honor” (39). But this is not so, for if the honor 
code only contains some moral prescriptions (not all of them), it could 
also contain immoral prescriptions that offend not against the moral pre-
scriptions that the honor code contains, but rather against others which it 
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does not contain. If an honor code is going to be such as to be necessarily 
in harmony with morality, it will need to contain all moral prescriptions, 
not just some of them.
But suppose that an honor code does indeed contain every moral pre-
scription or limits itself in a way that is deferential to morality (as in 
Sessions’s second way of characterizing a moral honor code). This still 
isn’t going to be enough to guarantee that honor—as Sessions conceives 
of it—will not collide with morality. At least on many views, morality 
is not just a matter of acting in accordance with moral prescriptions; it’s a 
matter of following moral prescriptions, which involves acting not only in 
the right way, but also for the right reasons. Personal honor, as Sessions 
conceives of it, seems to me to leave no room for this. Remember that 
“the primary commitment of a personally honorable person, as such, 
must always be to the honor group and its code, whatever that code may 
be.” So even when the personally honorable person acts in accordance 
with a moral precept, it’s not because it’s the right thing to do, it’s because 
she happens to be committed to a certain group of people and a code 
of honor that happens to include (or defer to) the precept. At least on a 
broadly Kantian way of looking at morality, the motivational structure 
here is all wrong.
This strikes me as the most serious problem for Sessions’s suggestion 
that personal honor might be valuable and inspirational for us. When he 
discusses what honor has to offer us, he notes that it can provide a very 
concrete and particular motivation for acting as morality demands. He 
says:
As a set of universally binding and overriding principles, morality is rather 
abstract and general, lacking in motive power. What moral honor adds to 
morality are social embeddedness, concrete power of motivation, possibly a 
sense of individual identity, and even a meaningful life. (40)
This is a provocative and controversial set of claims. One might well want 
to complain that Sessions is mischaracterizing morality here. But even if 
he’s not, adding an extra-moral motivator (e.g., “living up to others’ ex-
pectations” [40]) for moral action is worrisome. Adding the extra-moral 
motivator arguably drains the moral worth out of the relevant actions by 
replacing the correct motivation (which Sessions finds too abstract) with 
one that’s morally worthless (at best!).
As I noted at the outset, Sessions’s main thesis has two parts: the con-
cept of personal honor (i) helps us to understand our social reality, and (ii) 
might provide us with an inspiring ideal. Above, I’ve been complaining 
mostly about the second part of this thesis. I think Sessions’s case for the 
first part is actually much more compelling and interesting (though I’m 
not yet fully convinced). Part II of Honor for Us casts warriors, sportsmen, 
patriots, academics, and professionals as honor groups. It is indeed fasci-
nating to look at these groups through this lens. Some of the groups (e.g., 
warriors) seem to exhibit the characteristics of honor groups more than 
122 Faith and Philosophy
others (e.g., academics). This part of Sessions’s book gives us much food 
for thought, especially in light of what I see as his failure to establish part 
(ii) of his main thesis. For, if personal honor is indeed zealously sought 
after in these groups, this is potentially quite worrisome from the stand-
point of morality. 
